For formal cooperation to exist, one has to be able to point at exactly what the cooperation definitely is. This Peters does not do. He simply asserts (for example) that exchanging a dirty needle for a clean needle is an act of cooperation with the evil of drug abuse.

Is the cooperation because of the needle itself? How could it be? Because of the way that needle exchange works, the needle itself is not physical matter for the cooperation. Before the exchange, the addict has a needle. After the exchange, the addict has a needle. No change there, and hence no material cooperation on that account.

We may more reasonably ask whether the fact that the addict is supplied a clean needle will make it more likely that the addict will continue to abuse drugs. If it does encourage the addict to continue, then there would be a case that the needle exchange was a formal cooperation with the addict. But at this point we have raised a question that must be answered by the use of  prudence. Perhaps it does make it more likely, perhaps it doesn’t. To answer that question we may look at the relevant statistics for populations of drug users, or we might use our judgment about a particular drug user. Circumstances can indeed make a difference.

We might also ask if the needle exchange could encourage non drug-users to become drug addicts, on the misguided idea that it will somehow not be very dangerous, or whether — to counter such ignorance — we can sufficiently publicize and explain that many other great dangers of drug abuse will not be avoided.

If, after exercising  prudence in this way, we come to the conclusion that the exchange of a dirty needle for a clean needle does not make it more likely that drug misuse is encouraged, then we can, with moral safety, go ahead with the exchange.

Hence we can see Bishop Hubbard making a prudential decision that there is no cooperation (material or emotional) with drug abuse, and approving the program. Others might use their own prudence, and disagree with the decision. But there is no definite grounds for concluding that there has been formal cooperation with drug abuse.

The teaching is most clearly found in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor #80, which says:

Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object”.¹³¹ The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts:

… whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit … all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator.

Why is torture wrong?

As seen in the teaching above, it is because it violates the integrity of the human person.

What does that mean: the integrity of the human person?

Each human person is intended to possess certain powers or attributes. If any of those are taken away, this is a reduction of human integrity.

Such as?

A normal human body possesses four limbs. If one of those is removed, the integrity of the human body has been damaged. Likewise, the human mind is intended to use reason; removing this ability is a reduction in integrity.

What would be a violation of human integrity?

A violation of human integrity would be a morally avoidable loss of integrity.

Such as?

If the progression of a disease threatens a human life, a doctor may choose to amputate a limb. Although this is a loss in integrity, it does not amount to a moral violation, if the doctor was faced with an unavoidable choice between life and a limb (i.e. between a greater integrity and a lesser). But someone simply choosing to amputate their limb (because, say, it will make them an object of sympathy to others) is a violation of human integrity.

When is torture permitted?

It is not permitted for any intention. As the teaching indicates, it is an intrinsece malum, an intrinsic evil.

Is torture permitted in order to save someone else’s life?

No.

Is torture permitted in order to save a city?

No.

Is torture permitted in order to save a country?

No. (Do I have to go on?)

Didn’t the Church teach the permissibility of the torture of heretics in the papal document Ad Extirpanda, written in 1252?

That document gives no list of what the civil authorities are permitted to do to force confessions. But it does forbid “membri diminutionem, & mortis periculum” — “diminishment of limbs or danger of death”. It is thus a relatively undeveloped form of the same teaching that is given in Veritatis Splendor. (The historical record will show that the practice of torture certainly tainted some Church figures. But not the teaching.)

Even given those questions and answers, we can easily still feel unsure of being able to understand what actions might or might not constitute torture. For example, one definition of torture, as proposed by Policraticus, and approved by Mark Shea, illustrates what can go wrong. Their suggested definition is that torture is:

1. violation of human dignity in the form of
2. intentional mental and/or physical harm in order to
3. use a human person as a means (or instrument) for some producible end
4. against that person’s will.

1. is immediately a puzzle, since the Church indicates that torture is a violation of integrity, so introducing dignity just confuses matters. As for 2.,3.,4., take the case of putting someone in prison for a crime. Will they be mentally harmed? Surely, as mental depression would not be at all unexpected. Is putting the person in prison a means to an end? Yes, because one of the ends is a deterrence to other criminals. Is it against the prisoner’s will? Obviously. So, based on that definition, we could conclude that putting someone in prison is a torture. But it’s not. So there is something wrong with that definition.

In search of a better definition for torture, consider two cases. In the first, we tell a convicted terrorist that unless he helps us locate his collaborators, we will be pushing pins into his fingernails. In the second, we tell a convicted terrorist that unless he helps us locate his collaborators, we will add five years to his jail time. What makes the first case torture (which I certainly think it is), whereas the second case is not torture (since an increased prison term is generally considered reasonable given the lack of cooperation of a criminal)?

We must compare the two cases by comparing how they affect the integrity of the people involved. (We know that integrity is key because the Church has told us so.) In the case of prison, the primary affect on the prisoner is that their possible range of actions is drastically curtailed, but there is no elimination of some part of their integrity. They can still reason, they can still interact with people, and so on. (Of course, if they were put in complete solitary confinement, deprived of even seeing the guards — or if they were tightly chained to a wall for extended periods of time, then we would start to think that some integrity had been lost.)

On the other hand, what is the result of pushing pins into someone’s fingernails? Great pain. And pain attracts our immediate attention and focus. With enough pain, ordinary thinking becomes impossible — the person in pain can think of almost nothing else except the pain. And that’s a loss in integrity. It’s not the pain itself that causes the loss of integrity, but the effect on the process of reasoning. (And it’s not necessarily the amount of pain that is the issue — even small amounts of pain applied regularly can end up having huge affects on our mental processes. E.g. bullying).

One of the funnier falsehood current is the claim that I “refuse to define” what torture is and that I claim that “to ask that question is to sin”.

So, let’s look at his suggestions (in bold):

A) Check the dictionary;

Dictionaries are very useful for giving several ideas as to how words may be used. They simply don’t aim to give the definition which is consistent with Catholic teaching. Thus, they give definitions that are sometimes relevant, and sometimes not. Without a way of already knowing which is which, dictionaries don’t help. (E.g. “extreme anguish of body or mind” is not the appropriate definition, whereas “the act of inflicting excruciating pain as a means of getting information” is in the right area. But if I didn’t already have a good idea of what torture referred to in the Catholic context, how could I determine this from the dictionary?)

B) Check the Army Field Manual or some reference book for police interrogators on proper treatment of prisoners.

I looked at the US Army Field Manual, and all I could find amounted to “don’t torture”. So, no definition.

C) The Interrogator’s Golden Rule seems reasonable: “Don’t do it to a prisoner if you’d consider it abuse when done to a buddy or yourself.”

I can think of lots of things that I would call abuse if applied to a buddy, which wouldn’t necessarily amount to torture. A wider set of actions can be described as abuse. So, this gets us not much closer to a definition.

D) If you are still utterly baffled, you could try paying attention to Policratus’ handy delineation of the question, which is, of course, just a regurgitation of the Church’s basic teaching:

[T]he Church defines torture formally (i.e., what makes an action torture):
1. violation of human dignity in the form of
2. intentional mental and/or physical harm in order to
3. use a human person as a means (or instrument) for some producible end
4. against that person’s will.
These are the essential features of torture, and any material action with this form is torture. And it does not take any meticulous reasoning to figure out which material acts bear this essential form.
Church sources: Veritatis Splendor 80, Gaudium et spes 27.

Clearly Policraticus is much more helpful. But the difficulty is that Policraticus has, in trying to summarize Church teaching, partly used his own wording to Church teaching, and left out some things. So we end up with something that is not precise, and thus vague in application.

For example, Policraticus says that torture is a “violation of human dignity”. In fact, when we look at Veritatis Splendor and Gaudium et Spes, it is described as a violation of “the integrity of the human person”. This certainly does not mean that torture is not also a violation of human dignity, but some of the careful wording chosen by Vatican II is lost, and this loses some help in figuring out the definition of torture.

Or, also: to use a human person as a means for some producible end is not, by itself, a problem. Looking at Veritatis Splendor, one of the things that it says are offensive to human dignity is the use of laborers as “mere instruments of profit”. The word mere is there for a reason: to make a profit from someone’s work is acceptable, but when humans are used only as a means of profit, then dignity has been lost.

So, for these and other reasons, Policraticus’ definition falls short. As written, arguably, a parent putting a child in timeout could be a form of torture, or putting someone in prison could be torture. Someone pointed out this problem to Mark Shea as: “I guess if I give my kid a swat on the bottom in order to tell me where he hid his sister’s toy, that’s torture…”, to which Mark gave the reply: “And people wonder why I think some folks are insincere in their professed bafflement.”

So, note again that Mark Shea starts his whole post by saying:

One of the funnier falsehood current is the claim that I “refuse to define” what torture is and that I claim that “to ask that question is to sin”.

Mark insists that he has defined torture. He proposes a definition. When his proposed definition in fact falls short, does he offer to tighten it up? No, he attacks the sincerity of those pointing out the problem. Hasn’t he proved the truth of what he claimed was a falsehood?

The proposed definition can be tightened up. It would be very profitable to tighten it up, because it would point out more exactly what is wrong with torture, and also make it much easier to identify forms of torture that are currently going unrecognized.