The teaching is most clearly found in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor #80, which says:

Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object”.¹³¹ The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts:

… whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit … all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator.

Why is torture wrong?

As seen in the teaching above, it is because it violates the integrity of the human person.

What does that mean: the integrity of the human person?

Each human person is intended to possess certain powers or attributes. If any of those are taken away, this is a reduction of human integrity.

Such as?

A normal human body possesses four limbs. If one of those is removed, the integrity of the human body has been damaged. Likewise, the human mind is intended to use reason; removing this ability is a reduction in integrity.

What would be a violation of human integrity?

A violation of human integrity would be a morally avoidable loss of integrity.

Such as?

If the progression of a disease threatens a human life, a doctor may choose to amputate a limb. Although this is a loss in integrity, it does not amount to a moral violation, if the doctor was faced with an unavoidable choice between life and a limb (i.e. between a greater integrity and a lesser). But someone simply choosing to amputate their limb (because, say, it will make them an object of sympathy to others) is a violation of human integrity.

When is torture permitted?

It is not permitted for any intention. As the teaching indicates, it is an intrinsece malum, an intrinsic evil.

Is torture permitted in order to save someone else’s life?

No.

Is torture permitted in order to save a city?

No.

Is torture permitted in order to save a country?

No. (Do I have to go on?)

Didn’t the Church teach the permissibility of the torture of heretics in the papal document Ad Extirpanda, written in 1252?

That document gives no list of what the civil authorities are permitted to do to force confessions. But it does forbid “membri diminutionem, & mortis periculum” — “diminishment of limbs or danger of death”. It is thus a relatively undeveloped form of the same teaching that is given in Veritatis Splendor. (The historical record will show that the practice of torture certainly tainted some Church figures. But not the teaching.)

Even given those questions and answers, we can easily still feel unsure of being able to understand what actions might or might not constitute torture. For example, one definition of torture, as proposed by Policraticus, and approved by Mark Shea, illustrates what can go wrong. Their suggested definition is that torture is:

1. violation of human dignity in the form of
2. intentional mental and/or physical harm in order to
3. use a human person as a means (or instrument) for some producible end
4. against that person’s will.

1. is immediately a puzzle, since the Church indicates that torture is a violation of integrity, so introducing dignity just confuses matters. As for 2.,3.,4., take the case of putting someone in prison for a crime. Will they be mentally harmed? Surely, as mental depression would not be at all unexpected. Is putting the person in prison a means to an end? Yes, because one of the ends is a deterrence to other criminals. Is it against the prisoner’s will? Obviously. So, based on that definition, we could conclude that putting someone in prison is a torture. But it’s not. So there is something wrong with that definition.

In search of a better definition for torture, consider two cases. In the first, we tell a convicted terrorist that unless he helps us locate his collaborators, we will be pushing pins into his fingernails. In the second, we tell a convicted terrorist that unless he helps us locate his collaborators, we will add five years to his jail time. What makes the first case torture (which I certainly think it is), whereas the second case is not torture (since an increased prison term is generally considered reasonable given the lack of cooperation of a criminal)?

We must compare the two cases by comparing how they affect the integrity of the people involved. (We know that integrity is key because the Church has told us so.) In the case of prison, the primary affect on the prisoner is that their possible range of actions is drastically curtailed, but there is no elimination of some part of their integrity. They can still reason, they can still interact with people, and so on. (Of course, if they were put in complete solitary confinement, deprived of even seeing the guards — or if they were tightly chained to a wall for extended periods of time, then we would start to think that some integrity had been lost.)

On the other hand, what is the result of pushing pins into someone’s fingernails? Great pain. And pain attracts our immediate attention and focus. With enough pain, ordinary thinking becomes impossible — the person in pain can think of almost nothing else except the pain. And that’s a loss in integrity. It’s not the pain itself that causes the loss of integrity, but the effect on the process of reasoning. (And it’s not necessarily the amount of pain that is the issue — even small amounts of pain applied regularly can end up having huge affects on our mental processes. E.g. bullying).

Let’s honor the conscience of those who disagree with abortion, and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure that all of our health care policies are grounded not only in sound science, but also in clear ethics, as well as respect for the equality of women.

What does it mean? Like many political speeches, it commits to as little specific detail as possible. First there’s a call for a “sensible” conscience clause. Sensible? Could mean anything. But rather than stopping at that point, the sentence carries right on, with a call for “sound science” (who could disagree?) and “clear ethics” (yes, again), and … “respect for the equality of women”. What is the intention behind that? It refers to the desire of some to have guaranteed access to particular medical procedures, such as abortion or birth control — i.e. exactly the procedures that a conscience clause would protect.

So, all in all, one side wants a conscience clause, and the other side wants access despite the conscience clause. Obama says that this will be resolved by a sensible conscience clause. It’s a rhetoric of fog. Inside that fog anything might be conjured up.

One of the funnier falsehood current is the claim that I “refuse to define” what torture is and that I claim that “to ask that question is to sin”.

So, let’s look at his suggestions (in bold):

A) Check the dictionary;

Dictionaries are very useful for giving several ideas as to how words may be used. They simply don’t aim to give the definition which is consistent with Catholic teaching. Thus, they give definitions that are sometimes relevant, and sometimes not. Without a way of already knowing which is which, dictionaries don’t help. (E.g. “extreme anguish of body or mind” is not the appropriate definition, whereas “the act of inflicting excruciating pain as a means of getting information” is in the right area. But if I didn’t already have a good idea of what torture referred to in the Catholic context, how could I determine this from the dictionary?)

B) Check the Army Field Manual or some reference book for police interrogators on proper treatment of prisoners.

I looked at the US Army Field Manual, and all I could find amounted to “don’t torture”. So, no definition.

C) The Interrogator’s Golden Rule seems reasonable: “Don’t do it to a prisoner if you’d consider it abuse when done to a buddy or yourself.”

I can think of lots of things that I would call abuse if applied to a buddy, which wouldn’t necessarily amount to torture. A wider set of actions can be described as abuse. So, this gets us not much closer to a definition.

D) If you are still utterly baffled, you could try paying attention to Policratus’ handy delineation of the question, which is, of course, just a regurgitation of the Church’s basic teaching:

[T]he Church defines torture formally (i.e., what makes an action torture):
1. violation of human dignity in the form of
2. intentional mental and/or physical harm in order to
3. use a human person as a means (or instrument) for some producible end
4. against that person’s will.
These are the essential features of torture, and any material action with this form is torture. And it does not take any meticulous reasoning to figure out which material acts bear this essential form.
Church sources: Veritatis Splendor 80, Gaudium et spes 27.

Clearly Policraticus is much more helpful. But the difficulty is that Policraticus has, in trying to summarize Church teaching, partly used his own wording to Church teaching, and left out some things. So we end up with something that is not precise, and thus vague in application.

For example, Policraticus says that torture is a “violation of human dignity”. In fact, when we look at Veritatis Splendor and Gaudium et Spes, it is described as a violation of “the integrity of the human person”. This certainly does not mean that torture is not also a violation of human dignity, but some of the careful wording chosen by Vatican II is lost, and this loses some help in figuring out the definition of torture.

Or, also: to use a human person as a means for some producible end is not, by itself, a problem. Looking at Veritatis Splendor, one of the things that it says are offensive to human dignity is the use of laborers as “mere instruments of profit”. The word mere is there for a reason: to make a profit from someone’s work is acceptable, but when humans are used only as a means of profit, then dignity has been lost.

So, for these and other reasons, Policraticus’ definition falls short. As written, arguably, a parent putting a child in timeout could be a form of torture, or putting someone in prison could be torture. Someone pointed out this problem to Mark Shea as: “I guess if I give my kid a swat on the bottom in order to tell me where he hid his sister’s toy, that’s torture…”, to which Mark gave the reply: “And people wonder why I think some folks are insincere in their professed bafflement.”

So, note again that Mark Shea starts his whole post by saying:

One of the funnier falsehood current is the claim that I “refuse to define” what torture is and that I claim that “to ask that question is to sin”.

Mark insists that he has defined torture. He proposes a definition. When his proposed definition in fact falls short, does he offer to tighten it up? No, he attacks the sincerity of those pointing out the problem. Hasn’t he proved the truth of what he claimed was a falsehood?

The proposed definition can be tightened up. It would be very profitable to tighten it up, because it would point out more exactly what is wrong with torture, and also make it much easier to identify forms of torture that are currently going unrecognized.

But, a quick three-step argument that the choice to use the bomb was a big mistake:

1) The atomic bombs cause a big explosion, indiscriminately destroying a wide area. (I guess that part is not so controversial?)

2) There were lots of civilians in that area. (Agreed?)

3) The military shouldn’t aim to win by indiscriminately killing civilians. (I wish that wasn’t controversial. But it’s the way it should be.)

Ergo, the decision to drop was wrong.

Because, if any enemy wants to avoid the discovery of information through torture, then they have the precise incentive to prepare all plans so that they remain as secret as possible, as well as compartmentalize all information, so that the effect of discovered information is limited. (Just as the French resistance did when fighting the Gestapo.)

Additionally, if the enemy counts their own lives as worth relatively little (and I expect you can think of examples of this kind of enemy in the current world) then they will be encouraged to give up their lives yet more readily than they already do.

Look at those two effects of choosing to torture: enemies will plan more carefully, and give up their lives more readily.  Yes, torture is both evil and stupid.

He did not refer to it, but

Which is a wonderful way of being able to write about almost anything at all — there being an infinite number of things that aren’t mentioned in any talk. So what did the writer have in mind?

there is conflict between Catholic dogma and scientific conventions on several fronts

The writer’s purpose becomes a little clearer. Dogma (bad-word) versus scientific convention (good-words). Religion versus science. But still murky writing because a convention is a “set of agreed, stipulated or generally accepted standards, norms, social norms or criteria”. So, not scientific knowledge itself, but merely a social working agreement about certain aspects of it, amendable as socially decided — which of course actual scientific knowledge is not. Though the writer perhaps had science in mind, his point is watered down to a disagreement between religion and particular social conventions.

including

Now we’re looking for a list of what the writer considers to be “scientific conventions” that are in conflict with “Catholic dogma”.

the medical definition of brain death

But which definition? There are several, because medical decisions have consequence for further treatment,  further expense, and the harvesting of organs. There isn’t much Catholic dogma in this area beyond a desire to make sure that dead is really dead. Since the social convention of the point of death has consequences for the availability of resources and other financial considerations, there is clearly a temptation to define it as early as possible. And perhaps too early. Hence Catholic caution in this area.

the legal definition of the beginning of human life

That’s clearly not a scientific convention (though it may have some scientific input), but a social and legal convention. Much the same considerations apply as to the definition of death.

and the ethics of embryonic stem cell research

And if you’re talking about ethics, then “scientific” doesn’t come into it. Science produces no ethics whatsoever. No amount of is can produce an ought. (There is vast muddiness and stimulated ignorance on this point, not just in this article.)

I have no idea which is the best approach.

And neither does Thompson.

UPDATE: Ahmadinejad spouted his usual stuff, and this led to a walkout by some delegates, quite understandably. It's perhaps a little more clear why the United States, in particular, decided not to attend. If it has decided to engage Iran on the diplomatic front, then attending the conference would necessitate a walkout, which would make further diplomatic engagement with Iran much more difficult.

In his speech, Schmidt said:

[Marriage] has always been defined as the legal union of a man and a woman

Pretty much always and everywhere, throughout history, it has been assumed, without puzzlement or contention, or precise definition, that marriage is the union of a man and a woman, whether in a legal framework or in the complete absence of one.

But Schmidt’s definition misses out a central feature of marriage — the feature that distinguishes marriage from a mere partnership of adults. Marriage is the union of a man and a woman for the purpose of producing and raising children. If the goal of children is missed out, the the purpose of marriage is lost. Without the goal of children, the adult partnership may be something of value, but it is not nearly the same value as a partnership that produces children. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness originates in each and every child and grows with each. To set in place a system of laws that allows this to occur, and nurtures it every step of the way is thus quite surely part of the national creed. And for that reason, the definition of marriage is central to any national creed.

Having missed out children, Schmidt’s thinking on marriage very rapidly goes astray.

it is a tradition, not a creed, or, at least, not a national creed. It is not how we define ourselves as Americans.

In the American context, it is not defined in a national creed because people took it as something whose purpose was obvious, unchallenged, and not something in desperate need of clarification. And that same context applies over worldwide history.

we should understand that traditions do change over time in every society

Well, yes. Sometimes for better, and sometimes for worse. So which is it? And decided on what grounds?

I respect the opinions of Americans who oppose marriage for gay couples on religious grounds.  I may disagree, but if you sincerely believe God’s revealed truth objects to it then it is perfectly honorable to oppose it.  But those are not the grounds on which a political party should take or argue a position.  If you put public policy issues to a religious test you risk becoming a religious party, and in a free country, a political party cannot remain viable in the long term if it is seen as sectarian.

That is rather akin to a method of thinking that is more commonly seen among Catholic Democrats who wish to vote for legalized abortion — “I personally think it is wrong, but I am not going to impose my religious beliefs on others”. But what’s believed on religious grounds may simultaneously be believed on rational grounds. For example, a firm belief that theft is wrong on religious grounds is not thereby a bar to voting for secular laws against theft — good secular non-religious reasons against theft can be found.

Certainly, what is purely a religious matter should not be imposed on others who disagree. Opposition to abortion is not a purely religious issue, and neither is support for traditional marriage. If political parties have to find support from those whose thinking is partly religious, then they will just have to live with it, for the good secular reasons.

As in fact they always have: the opposition to slavery was such an issue, partly based in religious belief and partly on rational grounds. The various political parties of the 1800s danced around that issue for quite some time. Schmidt’s line of thinking could  have the Republican party end up dancing with two partners who dislike each other, and in each alternate dance they would try to keep the other partner happy. You can keep that up for quite a while, just like the Whigs. But then they will end like the Whigs.

Here’s the reference, in Obama’s words:

Now, there's a parable at the end of the Sermon on the Mount that tells the story of two men. The first built his house on a pile of sand, and it was soon destroyed when a storm hit. But the second is known as the wise man, for when "the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock."

That’s a slightly loose description of of a passage from the gospel of Matthew. Here’s the original:

"Every one then who hears these words of mine and does them will be like a wise man who built his house upon the rock; and the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, but it did not fall, because it had been founded on the rock.  And every one who hears these words of mine and does not do them will be like a foolish man who built his house upon the sand;  and the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell; and great was the fall of it."

Since the original is not much longer than Obama’s summation, why not just quote it directly? Well, pretty obviously, Jesus was not giving remedial advice on architectural design, he was relying on his audience knowing that it was a bad idea to build on a poor foundation for a house, and using that fact to point out what a good foundation was for people: Jesus’ own words. That’s what makes it a parable: point at what’s visible and concrete, so as to point beyond it to invisible principle.

But Obama’s speech-writers then willy-nilly go on to point only at the visible, and not at any kind of principle. Why bother to bring in a gospel text if in fact you’re not going to use it in a relevant way? They could simply have said: “We need to build on a good foundation” and go on from there. We don’t need the gospels to understand how to build physical houses. The gospels speak of more than that. Obama’s reference only ends up speaking of much less than the gospel.

( The speech-writers then go on to point out five things that Obama proposes to do. They decide to call them “five pillars”, and if you google “five pillars” you’ll soon find out what other religion they wanted to bring in to the speech, so as to be all diverse.)

If the gospel is going to be brought in such an irrelevant way, perhaps there is more that we can be looking forward to? “And some fell into good soil and grew, and yielded a hundredfold” could be slipped in to the next speech on agricultural policy. “And they took up twelve baskets full of broken pieces and of the fish” would do well for recycling. “For what does it profit a man, to gain the whole world and forfeit his life” could be fitted into banking regulation.

O beautiful for spacious skies,
For amber waves of grain,
For purple mountain majesties
Above the fruited plain!

America contains many good things; it would be hard to contest that. And if it were contested, I could simply look out of my window and see them for myself.

America! America!

Here some seem to think that the words mean that the hymn is addressed to something non-existent thing that is an idol. But it's simply addressed to people in America.

God shed his grace on thee
And crown thy good with brotherhood
From sea to shining sea!

After setting out some of the good things it possesses, the writer now implores God to give grace as well to America. It's a hymn. It's a prayer. Although all those physical things mentioned at the beginning of the hymn are genuinely good, but they need to be completed, crowned, by what is most important: complete brotherhood throughout the country. And it is God that is the source of that.

O beautiful for pilgrim feet
Whose stern, impassioned stress
A thoroughfare for freedom beat
Across the wilderness!

Like good verse, more than one thing is referred to here: both the westward trek (by foot, or wagon, or train) in America's history — but, but more importantly, also the repeated voices calling for freedom ("stern", "stress", "beat").

America! America!
God mend thine every flaw,
Confirm thy soul in self-control,
Thy liberty in law!

But again, appeal is made to God. Flaws still exist: souls lack self-control: freedom must be embedded in the people. This is not a perfect America, and it needs God.

O beautiful for heroes proved In liberating strife.
Who more than self the country loved
And mercy more than life!

Gaining freedom may require sacrifice, and the writer refers to John 15:13.

May God thy gold refine
Till all success be nobleness
And every gain divine!

But still God is needed to refine what good is possessed, so that success is defined as nobleness (a personal quality, and not an external possession), and gains are not physical or financial, but measured by God.

O beautiful for patriot dream
That sees beyond the years
Thine alabaster cities gleam
Undimmed by human tears!

And here the writer looks forward past any success that may be had in this world, to a future Heavenly city ("beyond the years", "undimmed by tears" as in Rev 21:1-4).

God shed his grace on thee
Till paths be wrought through
wilds of thought
By pilgrim foot and knee!

Again the writer refers through but past any history of discovery in America, and asks for God-given paths through all the wilds that still exist in thinking.

O beautiful for glory-tale
Of liberating strife
When once and twice,
for man's avail
Men lavished precious life !

Both wars are referred to, the Revolutionary and the Civil; sacrifices for freedom.

God shed his grace on thee
Till selfish gain no longer stain
The banner of the free!

And still the writer asks for flaws to be fixed, and a selfish America to be given grace.

Who could walk away from such sentiments? Would they not walk away from both America and the Church?

(Written July 4th 2007, within sight of Pike's Peak, and within sight of the amber waves, purple mountains, and fruited plains, by someone not in the slightest American.)

The Catholic social doctrine on immigration is not well understood by many. Likely that is for lack of reading, and not for any lack of writing by the Church. This present post prompted by a flawed posting in the blog The Cafeteria is Closed, but the same flawed idea could be found in many other places.

The flaw is the excessive regard for the sovereignty of a nation. The laws made by a nation are not important above all, but are themselves subject to moral requirements. The complaints made by The Cafeteria is Closed are about the ignoring of the law:

It's not the immigration policy that has created "a large underclass", it's the ignoring of the immigration policy that created it. Ignoring by, in no particular order, a) government, which doesn't have the balls to enforce the border, b) business, that continues to knowingly hire illegals and c) illegal immigrants who disrespect American sovereignty.

What's complained about in the above list of complaints is evidently law-breaking. But not even the slightest attention is paid as to whether the law is itself fully just. Because if the law is not just, then obedience is not required — in fact, for a well-formed conscience, disobedience may sometimes be required.

So we must at least ask the question: are there occasions in which a person morally must move to a different country, even if the accepting country has a law against it? What circumstances could lead to this?

Think of the fundamental unit of society: the family. The family has basic necessities: they must be fed, housed in decent conditions, given medical attention, educated, allowed to worship freely, and be protected by the law. If a family lives somewhere on the earth at point A, lacks some basic necessity, and can solve the problem by moving to point B without depriving some other family of these basic necessities, then it is just for it to move. It would be unjust to prevent the move. (Catechism #2241).

If country B has a law against such a move, then it is an unjust law. More so if country B has an excess of resources. That country has created an underclass. Those who move in order to satisfy basic necessities — which is a just move — are placed by their adoptive country in a contradictory position: their move is just, but their status is illegal.

Both the law and the requirements of migrants must be taken into account. Dessert and vegetables.

The Guide picks five "non-negotiable issues" to highlight: abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research, human cloning, and homosexual marriage. Clearly, those are important issues, but why those five issues, and not others? The reason the Guide gives is that those issues involve intrinsic evils. Actions are intrinsic evils if there is no moral way of choosing to perform them, whatever the circumstances or intentions. Thus, it is never possible to choose to vote for these intrinsic evils to be performed, and the Guide suggests ranking politicians according to their position on these issues, and selecting a vote depending on the ranking.

But the Guide's method of selecting issues is based on secondary principles, rather than on what is primary. A primary principle would have to be:

So, when selecting a candidate to vote for, first the issues should be sorted into those which are a matter of opinion, and those which are a matter of conscience.

 For example, if one candidate is in favor of building two hospitals and three schools, and the other is in favor of building three hospitals and two schools, then in most circumstances it would be a matter of opinion as to which is the best policy. You wouldn't be thinking to yourself: "Well I better decide which is truly the right policy, else I will be sinning."

However, for those who have a Catholic conscience, if one candidate is in favor of permitting abortion, and the other is not, then the choice is simple: the pro-abortion policy is unacceptable, since it is an intrinsic evil, and you would certainly be sinning to favor that policy. And likewise for all intrinsic evils.

But it's not just intrinsic evils which can affect our consciences, and allow us to choose between proposed policies. Some policies can be evil, even though they are not intrinsically evil.

For example, a government is permitted to collect taxes, even if those taxes are applied unequally to people — this is not an intrinsic evil. But if a politician suggested a policy of taxing only poor people, it could be opposed, in conscience, as being unjust.

So, since non-intrinsic evils can also be opposed to our conscience, it is entirely right to also include them in our considerations of who to support, along with intrinsic evils.

Once the issues have been sorted into those of opinion, and those of conscience, we must then follow our conscience, and use issues of conscience to rank candidates. To the extent that the Guide does not make allowance for non-intrinsic evils that may affect our consciences, it gives incomplete advice.

Try a dictionary

Well the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following as a definition: "The infliction of severe bodily pain, as punishment or a means of persuasion". That has problems: what does "severe" mean? Different people might legitimately have different subjective opinions about that, and that is incompatible with the notion of torture being something intrinsically wrong.

Consult the Geneva Conventions

But who were the people who came up with the Geneva Conventions, and why should we trust them?

Ask a cop. They have regulations which govern their treatment of prisoners.

Which cops?

Check the Army Field Manual on how to treat prisoners.

Which army, and which version of which manual, and why?

I'm of the opinion that Mark considers the definition of torture as something requiring only a limited amount of common-sense, and consequently that attempts to ask for something more precise are symptomatic of a wish to evade awkward questions about political and practical conduct. He may be right about that for some people, but not for all. In which case the lack of a definition hurts his cause (which is in fact my cause, since we share the Church's cause, and belief in its teaching). I'm extremely dubious that his approach is capable of coming up with a definition that is an intrinsic one, and not merely subjective.

I suggested an approach to an actual definition before, and would like to tune it further. I start from this principle:

It is always morally wrong to inflict pain on someone that is not to their direct benefit.

To clarify this (particularly the word "direct"), we need to consider some hypothetical cases:

• Suppose I vaccinate someone against a disease via a painful injection.  Can that be allowable? Surely so, because the direct result is that the person has received a chance of not getting the disease.
• Suppose I give someone a unwilling painful injection, with its only purpose being the intention of subsequently giving them $1000 as compensation. Is that allowable? No, because there is no direct link between the $1000 and the pain. (You could give them the $1000 without the injection, or you could change your mind after the injection.)
• Suppose I put someone in prison (after a just verdict) as punishment for a crime. Is that allowable? Yes, because it directly gives them the opportunity of redressing (in various ways) the disorder caused by the offense.

What then is torture? It would be the morally-wrong infliction of severe pain.

But doesn't such a definition leave itself open to the objection that "severe" isn't defined, and would be subjective? No, because in this case "severe" doesn't determine whether the action is morally wrong; even such actions below the level of severe are morally wrong.

The role of conscience

Besides torture being wrong, the Church has also taught (in Veritatis Splendor) that attempts to coerce the spirit are always wrong. This means attempts to coerce a person into acting against his conscience. In ordinary secular matters of crime, this is hardly ever of significance — criminals rarely steal because their conscience tells them to.

But during wars, it is much more common for conscience to be an issue. It is not unheard of for both sides in a war to be convinced that they are fighting because it is morally right to fight. In such cases, it is much easier to offend by an attempt at coercion. If I say to someone convinced of the rightness of their cause: "If you tell me your army's plans, I will give you a house and money," then I am wrongly attempting to coerce them to act against their conscience. Such cases do not get the attention necessary, though they are currently very relevant.

For example, one of the statements has:

the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are verbally inspired by God and inerrant in the original writing, so that they are fully trustworthy and of supreme and final authority in all they say.

According to the first way of looking at things, one might say that the statement is intended to eliminate appeal to the Catholic magisterium, and consequently disagree. On the alternative view, one might wonder what "final" and "supreme" actually mean. In the absence of an explanation included with the point, it is not clear. Scripture is true — how can there be something more supremely true than an ordinary truth? What is an authority? I doubt that evangelicals would be able to define that in a way that they would all agree. So, if a Catholic professor says that he can agree with the Wheaton wording, that seems like a reasonable claim.