Comments on: Double effect: again

By: Jonathan Prejean

Jonathan Prejean — Mon, 12 Jan 2009 18:26:12 +0000

Todd, I concur with your analysis of every case you outlined, including bombing the Hamas leader’s home (he clearly wasn’t posing an immediate danger from there, and it couldn’t remotely be considered a military target) and with respect to the school bombing, which would have to be evaluated in detail.

By: Todd V

Todd V — Sun, 11 Jan 2009 21:44:31 +0000

Jonathan – agree with your comments on indiscriminate carpet bombing or nuclear bombing (lets call it obliteration bombing). For example the “fire bombing” of Dresden used ordinary munitions but in an extraordinary way which led to the same sort of indiscriminate effect. Which also seems an official teaching by para 2314 of CC. This despite the fact that there is a sense in which those civilian deaths could be said to be “indirect” or “unintended”. But only if we are captive to a “Cartesian psychology” of what “intent” is (per Anscombe). Anyway, it demonstrates that general principles are very difficult to apply in particular situations in this area.
I myself don’t think there is a real distinction between the “indiscriminate obliteration bombing” scenario and Israel dropping a bomb on that Hamas leaders home where 1/2 his family was killed (I am discounting reports as not credible that Israel warned people in the home – if they did then that might be different).
I think the “school bombing” is unclear because we don’t know enough detail about what really happened in that firefight. If Israeli troops returned mortar fire from “near” the school by firing mortars at targets “near” the school and believed they could be accurate enough to minimize or realistically avoid civilian casualties, then it is arguably justified no matter how wrong it went.
Todd V

By: Jonathan Prejean

Jonathan Prejean — Fri, 09 Jan 2009 19:46:47 +0000

For example, we know with certainty that the deaths of innocents from the atomic bombings were considered to be integral to the object, a direct intention. As I understand it (given admittedly limited exposure to matters of moral theology with regard to nuclear weapons), the difficult with nuclear weapons used in cities is that they have no reasonable targeting ability. It's just not possible to deploy that kind of weapon without intending the deaths of innocents simply because it's just not possible to deploy that kind of weapon without intending destruction on a massive scale without any power of discrimination. With a bomb, you can make at least some reasonable effort to put the explosion closer to individual targets but with a nuclear weapon, the targeting ability is de minimis to the point of being negligible near populated areas. Because the targeting ability is so small as to be reasonably negligible, that makes the deployment of a nuclear weapon an act different in kind rather than degree, akin to indiscriminate carpet bombing where no attempt to regulate the use of force is being made, which is why one simply cannot deploy nuclear weapons in populated areas without directly intending innocent casualties. That is an error in principle, not merely by disproportion, because nuclear weapons in principle cause mass destruction that cannot be meaningfully targeted to any degree (and indeed, that characteristic appears to define the class of WMDs). But the error in principle is based on there being a difference in kind, not merely degree, with nuclear bombs (zero targeting ability) and ordinary munitions (with a continuum of targeting ability). I'd tend to agree that the scale of the conflict probably influences what level of targeting is reasonable. It might be that some weapons are only appropriate to forces on a very large scale, but I would suggest that there are not categorical limits, unlike the case of nuclear weapons.

By: M.Z. Forrest

M.Z. Forrest — Fri, 09 Jan 2009 18:15:38 +0000

I think the disagreement lies at least in part in the direct/indirect distinction. For example, we know with certainty that the deaths of innocents from the atomic bombings were considered to be integral to the object, a direct intention. Perhaps that is a point of contention, and it is just seen as outside the bounds of probability that the action could ever be proportionate. If we accept the former, then Zippy’s opinion is within the realm of possibility. Given VS’s explicitness in repudiating previous theories, I would look at it as a fairly strong possibility.
Where I come down on the matter myself is that aerial bombing is only understood to have the possibility of being licit as an act of war. In other words, I think we speak of a different teleological act in that case, and so I would think that we could apply double effect in such instances.

By: Jonathan Prejean

Jonathan Prejean — Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:00:23 +0000

Paul:
I entirely agree with this analysis. To clarify what I was saying at Mark Shea’s blog, an action could have two immediate causal effects, even if “double effect” reasoning doesn’t apply to that case because the essential causal elements of that act are intrinsically evil. In other words, even an evil action can have good effects, but that doesn’t excuse the action under double effect.
This fits nicely with what I said here:
http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2009/01/mars_and_venus_sitting_in_a_tr.html#comment-45252